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Risk in bank trading portfolios and its management are potentially important to the banks’ soundness
and to the functioning of securities and derivatives markets. In this paper, proprietary daily trading
revenues of 6 large dealer banks are used to study the bank dealers’ market risks using a market
factor model approach. Dealers’ exposures to exchange rate, interest rate, equity, and credit market
factors are estimated. A factor model framework for variable exposures is presented and two
modeling approaches are used: a random coefficient model and rolling factor regressions. The results
indicate small average market exposures with significant but relatively moderate variation in
exposures over time. Except for interest rates, there is heterogeneity in market exposures across the
dealers. For interest rates, the dealers have small average long exposures and exposures vary
inversely with the level of rates. Implications for aggregate bank dealer risk and market stability
issues are discussed.
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1.  Introduction 
  Bank dealers play a central role in securities and derivatives markets and are active 
traders in their own right.  Their trading risks and risk management are important to the 
banks’ soundness and the functioning of securities and derivatives markets.  In this paper, we 
use proprietary daily trading revenues of 6 large bank dealers to study their market risks 
using a market factor model approach.  We estimate the bank dealers’ exposures to exchange 
rate, interest rate, equity, and credit market factors.    
  Traditionally, the safety and soundness of the banking system has been the principal 
focus of interest in bank dealer risk.  Important for this purpose is the level of market risk 
taken by bank dealers and commonality in their risk exposures.  In recent literature, the focus 
has been extended to the effects of bank dealer and other trading institutions’ risk 
management policies on market stability.  In using risk measures based on market volatility 
and in particular Value-at-Risk (VaR), it has been argued that institutions’ demands for risky 
assets will move together, which will lead to exaggerated price movements and market 
instability.  When market volatility is low, institutions will increase demands to hold risky 
assets, putting upward pressure on prices and, when market volatility becomes high, 
institutions will attempt to reduce their positions in risky assets, putting downward pressure 
on prices.  This behavior is said to have exaggerated market instability in the late summer 
and fall of 1998 following the Russian ruble devaluation and debt moratorium and the near 
failure of LTCM.
1   
                                                 
1 For dynamic analyses of market effects of a VaR constraint, see Basak and Shapiro (2001), Danielsson, Shin, 
and Zigrand (2002), Persaud (2002), and Morris and Shin (1999).  For different analyses of the risk-taking 
incentives and portfolio choice effects of a VaR constraint, see Basak and Shapiro (2001), Cuoco and Liu 
(2003), and Alexander and Baptista (2004).    
 
 
2Despite the strong interest, there has been little study of bank dealer risks and risk 
management and there appears to be little formal evidence on the size, variation, or 
commonality in dealer risks.  In significant measure, this owes to limited public information 
on dealer positions and income which limits the study of dealer risks and risk management.  
Individual banks report on trading positions and revenues only quarterly and reporting is 
limited to securities and derivatives in broad market categories.  While there is weekly 
reporting, it includes security positions and transactions but only limited information on 
derivatives and data is reported only for aggregated primary (bank and non-bank) dealers.
2    
Bank VaRs, which forecast the maximum loss on the trading portfolio with a given 
confidence, provide a direct measure of market risk.  However VaRs do not reveal the 
dealers’ underlying market exposures or their size.  Berkowitz and O’Brien (2002) also found 
the risk forecast performance of the daily VaRs for the banks examined in this study to be 
weak.  Further, there was no common pattern in the correlation of VaRs across the banks.  
Here we apply a factor model to the daily trading revenues of 6 large bank dealers to 
estimate their market risk exposures.  Factor models have long been used to study portfolio 
and firm market risks (e.g., Chen, Roll and Ross (1986), Flannery and James (1984)).  Closer 
to our objectives is their application to mutual fund and hedge fund returns to characterize 
the market risks in the funds’ portfolios (e.g., Sharpe (1992), Fung and Hsieh (1997)). 
With daily trading revenues, we can study the effects of daily market price moves on 
the banks’ trading portfolios.  Also, the sample sizes are large, about 1200 daily observations 
per bank.  However, the trading revenue data is subject to significant limitations as well.  
                                                 
2 Jorion (2005) analyzes bank dealer trading risks and VaRs and implications for systemic market risk using 
quarterly reported trading revenues and VaR-based market risk capital requirements.  Adrian and Fleming 
(2005) provide a description of data collected and reported for primary securities dealers and present some 
evidence on dealer risk-taking based on dealer financing data.  
 
 
3Risk exposures can be inferred only through effects on trading revenues.  Trading revenues 
include fee and spread income and net interest income, as well as market gains and losses on 
positions.  Further, while used by the banks internally and required for VaR model testing, 
the daily trading revenues lack the accounting scrutiny accorded to quarterly reports.   
  In the standard factor model, factor coefficients represent estimates of fixed portfolio 
exposures.  For bank dealers, exposures are variable, as dealers actively trade their positions 
and are not buy and hold investors.  Thus, the standard factor model approach may not apply 
here.  This leads us to first consider a factor model framework and estimation issues when 
positions are variable.  The framework is used in implementing two empirical modeling 
approaches where trading positions are variable.  
  One approach is a random coefficient model, where the factor coefficients represent 
randomly varying market factor exposures.  Using the random coefficient framework of 
Hildreth and Houck (1968), the dealers’ mean exposures to different market factors and the 
variances of exposures are estimated.  Estimates of average daily market risk exposures are 
small relative to average trading revenues and cannot account for much of the trading 
revenue variation.  The signs of the exposures also differ across the banks, indicating 
heterogeneity in average exposures.  A notable exception is for the interest rate factor where 
all banks but one exhibit small net long exposures to interest rate risk.  
  Even with small average exposures risk-taking could still be large, since dealers could 
vary positions between large long exposures and large short exposures.  Our estimates 
indicate significant variation in market exposures that include both long and short positions.  
Nonetheless, the ranges of potential variation in trading revenues due to variation market 
exposures do not appear large relative to the total variation in trading revenues.   
 
 
4  The random coefficient model is based on highly simplifying assumptions about the 
variability in exposures.  Especially important is the assumption that exposures are 
independent of the market factors, which conflicts with portfolio strategies that are related to 
market prices.  This issue has also been important in hedge fund studies, some of whom have 
tailored the functional form of the factor model to certain types of portfolio strategies.  It is 
argued below that specifying an appropriate functional form requires a good deal of 
specificity on the portfolio strategy.  However, our information on bank dealer strategies is 
too sparse to formulate a specific portfolio strategy or unambiguously interpret results from 
alternative functional forms that might be used.   
  A more limited approach to considering market price-dependent trading strategies is 
taken here.  For each bank, a linear factor model with a 150-day rolling sample is estimated.  
Using historical plots, the 6 banks’ rolling regression factor coefficients are compared to the 
respective factors’ contemporaneous 150-day rolling means.  The latter will reflect periods of 
rising and declining market prices.  Of interest is whether the rolling coefficients move 
systematically with the factors.  This would indicate that the dealers’ market exposures vary 
with the market factors and, hence, a possible price-dependent trading strategy.   
  For all factors but interest rates, the 6 banks’ rolling factor coefficients show no 
common movement with the factors’ rolling means.  For the interest rate factor, the banks’ 
rolling factor coefficients tend to vary inversely with the level of the interest rate.  This 
would be consistent with the interest rate durations for their trading portfolios becoming 
larger (smaller) when rates are declining (rising).    
The samples for the factor regressions include many days when factor changes are 
small.  However, the conclusions are basically the same if we restrict the analysis to days of 
 
 
5large price movements.  The banks’ trading revenues do not show a common systematic 
relation with large price changes for the non-interest rate factors but trading revenues tend to 
be abnormally low on days of relatively large interest rate increases. 
In sum, our principal findings are significant heterogeneity across dealers in their 
market exposures, relatively small exposures on average and a limited range of long or short 
exposures.  Commonality in dealer exposures is limited to interest rate risk with exposure 
levels inversely related to the level of rates.  The implications of these results for aggregate 
bank dealer risk and market stability are discussed in the concluding section to the paper.     
  The remaining sections are as follows.  In the next section, the bank data and the 
distribution of trading revenues are described.  The factor model framework and empirical 
model specifications are developed in section 3.  The estimation and results for the random 
coefficient model are presented in section 4; the rolling regressions in section 5; and the 
relation between trading revenues and large market price changes in section 6.  
 
2.  Bank Trading Revenues 
  The Basel Market Risk Amendment (MRA) sets capital requirements for the market 
risk of bank holding companies with large trading operations.  The capital requirements are 
based on the banks’ internal 99th percentile VaR forecasts with a 1-day horizon.  Banks are 
required to maintain records of daily trading revenue for testing their VaR models.  The daily 
trading revenue for 6 large trading banks is used in this study.
3   
  All of the banks in the study meet the Basel MRA “large trader” criterion and are 
subject to market risk capital requirements.  Four of the 6 banks are among the largest 
derivatives dealers world wide and the other two are among the largest in the U.S.  The 6 
                                                 
3 The 6 banks were studied in Berkowitz and O’Brien (2002) using a shorter sample period.  
 
 
6trading banks and the sample periods for each bank were selected so as to exclude banks or 
periods for which there was a major merger which could substantially change the size and 
mix of trading.  So as not to reveal dollar magnitudes, trading revenues are divided by the 
sample standard deviations of the respective banks’ trading revenues. 
  Trading revenues are for the consolidated bank holding company and include gains 
and losses on trading positions, fee and spread income from customer transactions, and net 
interest income.  Trading positions are required to be marked-to-market daily. Some 
smoothing of daily valuations is possible, although this would conflict with mark-to-market 
accounting rules.  In this study, pricing inaccuracies are necessarily treated as a residual item.  
An attempt is made to represent the effects of fee and spread income and net interest income 
on trading revenues using proxy variables.  
In Figure 1, kernel densities for the banks’ trading revenues (divided by trading 
revenue standard deviations) are presented. A normal distribution having the same means and 
standard deviations as the banks’ distributions is provided for reference.   Descriptive 
statistics are presented in Table 1.  As Figure 1 and Table 1 show, trading revenues are 
typically positive.  For the median bank, mean daily trading revenues equal .78 trading 
revenue standard deviations.  As shown in the bottom of Table 1, losses occurred on less than 
20 percent of trading days for any bank.  The typically positive trading revenues likely reflect 
the importance of fee and spread income and net interest income.   
The trading revenue distributions also have high peaks and heavy tails, as revealed in 
Figure 1 and by the excess kurtosis statistics in Table 1.  The 5% and 95% quantiles for the 
banks’ trading revenues in the bottom panel of Table 1 lie inside 5% and 95% quantiles that 
would be consistent with a normal distribution.  The 1% and 99% and the .05% and 99.5% 
 
 
7quantiles lie outside quantiles consistent with a normal distribution.  There also is no 
indication of any common skewness in the banks’ trading revenue distributions  
To provide more information on the heavy tails, the lowest and highest 10 percent 
returns for each bank are plotted by historical dates in Figure 2.  The plotted values are 
expressed as deviations from trading revenue means and are divided by sample standard 
deviations.  With some exceptions for bank 1, the lowest 10 percent returns are all losses.   
Several features of Figure 2 are notable. 
One is that, while there is temporal clustering in both high and low returns, the 
clustering tends to be greater for low returns.  This asymmetry in temporal clustering may be 
due to periodic large fees earned by dealers from customer transactions that are more evenly 
dispersed through time.  In contrast, low returns are likely to reflect mostly portfolio losses 
from adverse market moves and persistency in market volatility (operational costs are not 
included in trading revenues).   
A second and related feature of Figure 2 is that all of the banks encountered loss 
clustering, with some also experiencing positive spikes, during the market turmoil in the late 
summer and fall of 1998.  The market instability during this period had important common 
effects on the banks’ trading revenues.  For all 6 banks, daily averages of trading revenues 
for the second half of 1998 were low and this period had a large effect on the full sample 
trading revenue kurtosis for banks’ 1, 2, 3, and especially 6.
4    
It should be noted that variation in dealer positions is also a potentially important 
determinant of the trading return distribution.  The dependency of the trading return 
                                                 
4 For the second half of 1998, daily averages of trading revenues for banks 1 to 6 were respectively .55, .39, -
.22, .15, .15, .39.  If the second half of 1998 is excluded from the sample, the excess kurtosis for banks’ 1 
through 6 are respectively 4.30, 2.63, 2.84 4.42, 6.07, and 4.64.  See Table 1 for comparable statistics for the 
full-period samples.  
 
 
8distribution on the dynamic management of positions under a VaR-constraint is a major 
feature in Basak and Shapiro (2001).    
Table 2 presents cross-bank correlations for daily trading revenues above the diagonal 
and, for comparison, cross-bank daily VaR correlations below the diagonal.  The trading 
revenue correlations are all positive and significant using a standard t-test.  The potential 
contribution of exposures to market factors on the trading revenue correlations is considered 
below.  In contrast, the bank VaR correlations show no common pattern, as correlations are 
both positive and negative and vary widely.    
 
3.  Factor Model with Varying Positions 
A factor model framework when positions are variable is developed here and used to 
guide the empirical specifications.  Consider a portfolio with positions in K risky securities 
and a risk-free asset.  Positions in securities and the risk-free asset may be long or short and 
include those held indirectly through derivatives.   For measuring the portfolio’s sensitivity to 
market factors, bid-ask spreads are abstracted from and the values of short or long positions 
are measured at a single price, e.g., the mid-market price.  The portfolio can be adjusted 
continuously but returns are observed only for discrete time units.   
Let t denote time measured in discrete units.  At the start of t, the bank holds an 
amount
0
kt x in risky security categories  1, , kK = " and 
0
0t x in the risk-free asset, which are 
referred to as the bank’s positions.  Positions may be carried over from t-1 or new positions 
may be set at the start of t prior to any price changes since t-1.  Positions and prices measured 
at the end of period t are denoted by ( ) k x t ,  0() x t  and ( ) k p t .  The price of the risk-free asset is 
fixed at 1.  Using this notation, the values of the portfolio at the start of t and at the end of t 
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For the factor model, we want to expresses the 1-period change in the portfolio value 
as a function of 1-period changes in market prices  ( ) ( ) ( ) (1 ) /(1 ) kk k k rt pt pt pt . ≡ −− −   If 
positions are fixed, the change in the portfolio value will be determined by the 1-period 
market price changes.  However, if positions are variable, the change in the portfolio value 
can be affected by intra-period price movements not revealed in the 1-period price changes.  
Thus, the suitability of a factor model when portfolio values are observed only discretely 
requires restrictions on intra-period position and/or possibly price changes.  A highly 
simplifying assumption made here is that intra-period changes in security positions and 
prices are uniform over the period.  This assumption becomes accurate for very short periods 
and it may be a reasonable approximation for 1-day returns.  It implies that the intra-period 
position and price changes can be measured from the full period changes.    
A second assumption is made to avoid complications from outside cash infusions or 
withdrawals:  There are no exogenous intra-period capital flows to the portfolio and intra-
period cash payments and accrued interest on positions are accumulated in a separate 
account.  Under this assumption, changes in positions at any timeτ within period t, ( ), kt dx τ  
made at prices  ( ), kt p τ will satisfy a self-financing constraint:    0
1
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Using the self-financing constraint and (1), the change in the portfolio value over the 
period,   is  
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where ( ) k x t Δ  is the change in the position over period t (see Appendix).  Note that 
0 1
(1 ) ( )(1 )
2
kt k k k xpt xtpt −+Δ −is the average position in the period valued at the price of k at 
the end of  t-1.       
  The change in the portfolio value can be expressed using a factor model form:  
 










where  .     is the value of the portfolio position in 
factor k and measure’s the portfolio’s exposure to factor shock    .  Unlike the standard 
factor model assumption, the factor exposures are not constant.  With daily data, they would 
reflect time-varying daily average positions.  Two specifications of (3) will be considered.   
()
0 () () 1 / 2 () ( 1 ) kk k k Vt xt xt pt ≡+ Δ − ( ) k Vt
() k rt
  For the first specification,  is assumed to be a random draw from a stationary 
process with mean 
( ) k Vt
k V .  Further, the positions’ values,  , are assumed to be independent 
of market factor changes and mutually independent.  Under these conditions, the portfolio 
return in (3) satisfies the random coefficient models developed in Hildreth and Houck (1968). 
( ) k Vt
 With  k V  as the mean position value in factor k and  () () kk vt Vt V k ≡ −  as the random 
change in the position value, the details of the factor model can be expressed by 
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where [ ( )] kk Er t μ ≡  is the expected change in the market price represented by factor k, 
kk vv σ is the variance for factor position k;  ww σ is the unconditional variance of changes in the 
portfolio value the portfolio, and  kl ω is the covariance (variance) for individual factors 
.  For the analysis below, it is assumed that  ()  a n d   () k rt rt l 0. k μ =  
  Equation (4a) expresses the change in the value of the portfolio as the sum of change 
in value conditioned on average positions and the change in value conditioned on the 
positions’ realized random components, the latter being defined in (4.b).  (4.c) and (4d) are 
the portfolio’s unconditional mean change and variance.  The unconditional variance is the 







= ∑ k  and  .  The variance is the sum of the factor variances 
and covariances weighted by the mean positions plus the sum of the products of the factor 
variances and position variances.  Thus, with variable positions, the volatility of positions 
interacts with the volatility of the factors in determining the dispersion of portfolio returns.   
() ut
  The factor model in (4) also provides for the correlation between the changes in 
banks’ i and j portfolio values that come from market factor shocks.  This correlation 
represents a measure of cross-bank commonality in market risks.  Using subscripts for banks’ 
i and j, we have (see Appendix) 
 
 
12(5)                           ˆˆ 11
ij ij i j ww ww i j uu i j RSR S R S R S ρρ ρ =+ − −              
 
where  ˆ () () () , ii i wt wt ut =+ ˆ () () ii wt rt V ≡ ( ) i ut and  is the residual for bank i in (4.b).  
  Equation (5) describes two sources of commonality in banks’ market risks.   ˆˆ ij ww ρ  is 
the correlation between changes in i and j’s portfolio values when factor exposures are 
conditioned on the mean positions.  One source of commonality is similar mean positions, 
which would make  ˆˆ ij ww ρ positive.  
ij uu ρ is the correlation associated with the variation in 
positions as reflected in  and    A second source is common variation in positions.   ( ) i ut () . j ut
i RS  and  j RS determine the relative importance of these two sources of correlated returns.  
i RS  is the (population) R-square from a regression of i’s portfolio value changes on market 
factors with factor coefficients set at their means  ˆˆ (/
ii i i iw w w w RS ) σ σ ≡ .   
  Using the random coefficient model and with observations on trading portfolio value 
changes and market factors, it is possible to estimate the bank dealers’ average factor 
positions and their variances and some components of the cross-bank correlations.  
  The assumptions of course are restrictive and limit the generality of results.  The 
assumption that position changes are mutually independent is one of notational convenience 
but potentially important for empirical tractability if there are many factors.  Dropping this 
assumption would require recognizing all the covariances between position changes in (4.d).   
  Assuming that market exposures are independent of factor changes is particularly 
limiting because portfolio management may be related to market price movements.  As 
discussed earlier, such polices have been said to adversely affect market stability.  Dropping 
 
 
13the assumption of independence has important effects on the factor model formulation and, 
specifically, can make portfolio returns non-linear in the factor changes, .    ( ) k rt
An illustration of this is when the portfolio is managed such that returns resemble a 
call or put option on say security k.  The option-like portfolio implies a position in the 
security and a cash position.  Changes in the security price have both first-order and higher-
order effects on the portfolio return.  The higher-order effects imply changes in the security 
and cash positions that are related to the factor price change.  For security k, ( ) k x t Δ  in (2) is 
positive and depends on the price change,  .   A second-degree polynomial provides a 
second-order approximation to the effect of the market factor on the portfolio value. 
( ) k rt
 
(6)                              
00 () () () () ( () ) kk k k wt a tr t b t r t =+
2
                                                
       
The coefficient for the linear component in (6) is analogous to the option’s delta and that for 
the quadratic component to the option’s gamma.   
Non-linear portfolio return equations such as (6) and returns expressed as functions of 
traded option values have been used in hedge fund studies to capture positions that vary with 
market returns.
5   However, a particular portfolio strategy, including the strategy horizon, is 
needed to specify or interpret a particular functional form.  For example, the strategy 
specified in the preceding illustration implies the squared market factor in (6) reflects the 
non-linear sensitivity of the portfolio to the market factor, i.e., the option’s “gamma.”  
Without this specification, the interpretation of the squared factor would be ambiguous (e.g., 
 
5 Chan et al (2004) use higher-order polynomials in market factors to capture non-linearity in hedge fund 
returns.  Agarwal and Naik (2004) use returns to call and put options as the factors in hedge fund factor 
regressions to capture the non-linearity between the hedge fund’s returns and the underlying market factors that 
arises from option-type trading strategies.  Mitchel and Pulvino (2001) apply a piecewise linear factor model in 
returns to risk arbitrage strategies 
 
 
14it might represent the sensitivity of the portfolio value to market volatility).  Further, the 
coefficients  and   expressed in (6) are for period t.  They depend on the security 
value at the start of the period and also the portfolio management horizon (option’s time to 
expiration).  Treating the two coefficients as constants implies that the portfolio is being 
rebalanced to a constant composition and horizon at the start of each sample observation, 
e.g., each month if observations are monthly.   
0() k at
0() k bt
For bank dealers, we have little specific information on their portfolio strategies and 
are not testing a specific strategy.  This lack of specificity includes the time dimension of the 
dealer’s strategy as it relates to our daily observation period.  
A less formal approach to price-dependent strategies is taken here.  For each bank, we 
estimate a linear regression of trading revenues on market factor changes (and non-market 
factor variables) with 150-day daily rolling samples.  For the 6 banks, the estimated rolling 
coefficients are plotted along with coincidental 150-day rolling means for the respective 
factors (factor price levels, not changes).  The 150-day rolling means will reflect periods of 
rising or declining market prices.  Of interest is whether the rolling factor coefficients move 
systematically with the factors.  This would indicate dealers’ market exposures vary with the 
market factors and, hence, a possible price-dependent strategy.  The significance of any 
comovement will be judged according to whether or not it is common among the 6 banks. 
While observed comovement between the factor coefficients and the factors would 
indicate that the dealers’ market exposures are related to the market factors, this may still not 
uniquely identify the price-dependent portfolio strategy.  We consider this issue in evaluating 
the rolling regression results.                     
 
 
15Before presenting the empirical factor models, the treatment of other components of 
trading revenues needs to be mentioned:  (1) Portfolio revenues include accrued and explicit 
interest payments and payments for risk-bearing.  (2) Trading revenues also includes fee and 
spread income from market-making.  We do not have direct measures of these additional 
components.  Proxy variables are used to capture the effects of trading volume and net 
interest income on dealer trading revenues.  (3) Portfolio revenues also are affected by (inter-
period) changes in the portfolio’s capital.  Changes in the capital of the portfolio are not 
explicitly accounted for other than what can be represented by a trend variable.   
 
4.  Random Coefficient Model 
  We first describe the explanatory variables used in the empirical analysis. 
4.1.  Explanatory Variables
In selecting market factors, four broad market categories are represented: exchange 
rates, interest rates, equity, and credit spreads.  For exchange rates, equities, and credit 
spreads multiple factors are used for each category.  A 10-year U.S. Treasury rate is used to 
capture interest rate risk in the trading portfolio.  In an earlier version, a 10-year rate and a 3-
month rate were used, with qualitatively similar coefficients estimated for both factors.  
There are a total of 11 market factors, which are identified in the top panel of Table 3 with 
descriptive statistics.  
For exchange rate factors, regional exchange rate indices were constructed.  They are 
weighted averages of log changes in individual country exchange rates.  The exception is 
Russia, the only Eastern Europe country for which we had historical data. The weights are 
shown in the bottom panel of Table 3.  They were constructed from world-wide dealer FX 
spot and derivatives turnover reported in BIS Central Bank Surveys in 1998 and 2001.   
 
 
16Exchange rate and equity factors are measured as log differences; interest rate and 
credit spread factors are first differences.  For the exchange rate and equity market factors, 
positive differences indicate increases in asset values and, for the interest rate and credit 
spreads, positive differences indicate decreases in asset values.   
  In addition to the market factors, a proxy variable is used to represent trading volume 
that generates fee and spread income.  We have do not have direct information on dealers’ 
daily transactions and use de-trended daily volume on the NYSE plus NASDAQ to represent 
a market volume influence on trading revenue.  Also, we do not have data on net interest 
income from trading positions.  To proxy for net interest income, we use a monthly lagged 
moving average of the 10-year U.S. Treasury rate.  This is intended to represent the gradual 
realization in the portfolio of upward and downward movements in interest rate levels.  
A trend variable is used to capture any trend in the level of the bank’s activity. 
Lagged trading revenue is also included.  If dealers smooth position revaluations, this could 
produce serially correlated returns. 
4.2.  Market Risk Estimates 
We use the GLS random coefficient estimators developed by Hildreth and Houck 
(1968) to estimate the banks’ mean exposures to the market factors,  k V  shown in (4.a), and 
the exposure variances, 
kk vv σ shown in (4.d) and (4.e).
 6   For the estimation we are assuming 
that is iid, independent of the market factors and that   and  are independent 
for k .  The residual in the trading revenue equation will include the residual that arises 
from random position changes, i.e.  in (4.b), as well as any independent sources of 
( ) k vt ( ) k vt ( )  l vt
l ≠
() ut
                                                 
6 Specifically, we use (14), p. 587, to estimate the coefficient variances and β  estimator in (25), p. 589, to 
estimate the mean market factor positions.    
 
 
17trading revenue not accounted for in the model.  Under these assumptions, Hildreth and 
Houck provide unbiased and consistent estimators of the mean coefficients and coefficient 
variances.  Here, we allow only the 11 market factors to have variable coefficients.   
Appendix Tables A.1 and A.2 contain the detailed regression results.  Reported 
coefficients are estimated using trading revenues divided by sample standard deviations and 
thus measure trading revenue effects in terms of trading revenue standard deviations.  The 
estimates are discussed here using several summary tables.  In the top part of Table 4, 
summary statistics for the regressions estimating mean exposures to the market factors and 
including other regressors are presented.  As shown, the full set of regressors has significant 
explanatory power based on F-values and regression R-squares.  However, the F-values 
measuring the joint explanatory power for the 11 market factors are not very high and do not 
exceed the .05 critical value for 2 banks.  Thus the market factors do not have a lot of 
explanatory power (excluding these factors from the regressions, causes the R-squares to 
drop by about 4 basis points).   Since the factor coefficients reflect the estimated mean factor 
exposures, this implies that average market exposures cannot account for much of the 
variability of trading revenues. 
In contrast, equity volume, used as a proxy for market transactions volume, is positive 
for all banks and highly significant for all but one bank (Appendix Table A.1).  Trading 
revenues also have a significant positive trend.  The estimated coefficients for the moving-
average interest rate (to proxy interest income) and lagged trading revenue have mixed signs 
and significance across the banks.   
The bottom part of Table 4 presents summary statistics for the regressions estimating 
the variances of the market factor coefficients.  While R-squares are low, the F-values are 
 
 
18highly significant, implying significant variability in the market factor coefficients.  The 
estimator used for the variances of the market factor coefficients is unbiased under the model 
assumptions.  While Hildreth and Houck suggest constraining the coefficient estimates to 
non-negative values (pp. 587-589), this constraint was not imposed here.  A little more than a 
third of the estimated coefficients are negative, although only 2 are significant at a .05 level 
and 1 at a .01 level (Appendix Table A.2).   We regard the negative coefficients as reflecting 
sampling error and exclude them evaluating the variability of the dealers’ market exposures.   
We have no reason to believe that this biases our interpretation of the results      
In Table 5, two measures of the dealers’ potential exposures to large market factor 
shocks are constructed using Appendix Tables A.1 and A.2.  The top number in each cell is 
equal to the respective factor’s coefficient from Table A.1—the estimate of the bank’s mean 
exposure to the factor—multiplied by a two standard deviation shock to the factor.  Recall 
that the coefficient estimates measure trading revenue effects in terms of trading revenue 
standard deviations.  Hence, the top number in the cell measures trading revenue effects in 
terms of trading revenue standard deviations from a two standard deviation factor shock. 
The two numbers underneath are the 2.5% and 97.5% estimated quantiles for factor 
exposures, i.e., 95 percent intervals.  The quantile estimates use the estimated mean 
coefficients  (Table A.1) and coefficient variances (Table A.2), and assume the coefficients 
are normally distributed.  The quantile estimates also are multiplied by two standard 
deviation factor shocks.  The shaded cells indicate where coefficient variance estimates are 
negative (a zero interval is reported but is not used the analysis below).       
Consider first the estimated mean factor exposures (the top number in each cell).   
The estimates are small compared to the mean trading revenues shown in Table 1. For all 
 
 
19factors, a 2 standard deviation market factor shock produces less than a .3 standard deviation 
change in a bank’s trading revenue and less than a .1 standard deviation change in trading 
revenue for two-thirds of the factors.  For the median bank, mean trading revenues equal .78 
standard deviations.  Thus, 2 standard deviation shocks to individual factors and even to 
multiple factors would still leave a positive expected trading revenue.  
Among individual market categories, the estimated mean exposures for the interest 
rate factor are negative for 5 of 6 banks.  The negative exposures would imply bank dealers 
have (small) net long exposures to interest rate changes on average, i.e., the portfolio 
duration is positive.  For the three other broad market categories, however, there does not 
appear to be a clear pattern of directional mean exposures to these market categories, 
although coefficients are mostly positive for the W. Europe exchange index.   Generally, the 
coefficients vary in sign across broad market categories for a given bank and for the most 
part across banks for a given factor.   
Now consider the estimated 95-percentile intervals for the market factor exposures 
reported under the mean exposure estimates in Table 5.  The interval estimates cover both 
positive and negative values, indicating factor exposures can vary between long and short 
positions.  Also, for the factor variances with non-negative estimates, the 95% coefficient 
bounds are large relative to the estimated mean coefficients.  However, the bounds do not 
appear to be particularly large when measured against the trading revenue quantiles shown in 
the bottom panel of Table 1.    
Specifically, the 95% bounds in Table 5 measure potential trading revenue variation 
from 2 standard deviation market factor shocks.  Conditioned on a 2-standard deviation 
factor shock, they represent 95% bounds on portfolio gains and losses.  The trading revenue 
 
 
20quantiles in Table 1 measure trading revenue variation due to market factor shocks and 
variation from other influences, such as market-making revenues.  The bounds in Table 5 
tend to be within the 1% and 99% quantiles for trading revenues shown in Table 1.  Also, the 
bounds in Table 5 are for 2 standard deviation market factor shocks.  Thus, trading revenues 
conditioned on estimates of relatively large factor exposures and factor shocks do not 
produce extreme outliers relative to the unconditional variability of the trading revenues.   
Overall, the results from the random coefficient model do not indicate that bank 
dealers take large market risks relative to the size of average trading revenues and trading 
revenue volatility and there is significant cross-dealer heterogeneity in exposures.  However, 
at times dealers may still have large exposures to particular factors creating the potential for 
significant losses on days of extreme market conditions.    
4.3.  Cross-Bank Trading Revenue Correlations 
  As described earlier in section B, cross-bank trading revenues show small but 
consistently positive correlations (Table 2).  As shown in equation (5) above, cross-bank 
trading return correlation due to market risk exposures can come from dealers either having 
common average exposures to market factors or common variation in exposures.  Based on 
the random coefficient regression results, average factor exposures seem unlikely to be an 
important source of cross-bank trading revenue correlation.  This can be determined by 
applying the mean and variance estimates of the random coefficients for the market factors to 
estimate  ˆˆ ij ww i j RSR S ρ  in (5) for banks’ i and j.
7   The cross-bank correlation component 
                                                 
7  ˆˆ ij ww ρ  is generated by historically simulating   for each bank using the estimated factor coefficients and 
historical factor data.  For 
ˆi w
ˆˆ/
ii ii iw w w w RS σ σ = ˆˆ i ww  ,
i σ is similarly obtained. 
ii ww σ  can be generated from 
 
 
21reflecting positions at their mean values was calculated for each pair of banks.  For all but 
one bank this component is less than .02 (for banks 2 and 4, it is -.04).   
If market exposures account for the most of the observed trading revenue 
correlations, it must be mainly due to common changes in banks’ exposures, i.e., the 
component  11
ij uu i j RSR S ρ −−  in (5).  To determine this component, requires estimates of 
the variable exposure component  in each bank’s residual revenue (equation (4b)).  The 
best that can be done is to use the factor model regression residuals for  to calculate 
( ) i ut
( ) i ut
11
ij uu i j RSR S ρ −−  for each combination of banks.  Unfortunately, the regression 
residuals will include both  and other unspecified components of trading revenues.      ( ) i ut
Nonetheless, correlations reported in the bottom panel of Table 6 were obtained by 
calculating  11
ij uu i j RSR S ρ −−  using the regression equation residuals (correlations above 
the diagonal are the trading revenue correlations displayed in Table 2).  The correlations 
below the diagonal typically are slightly more than half the trading revenue correlations 
above the diagonal.  Whether the former represent a small commonality in trading revenue 
due to common market exposures or due to other common influences on trading revenues not 
controlled for in the regressions is difficult to say.  Employing different approaches, further 
consideration is given to dealer commonality in market exposures in the next two sections 
 
5.  Rolling Regressions  
  In this section, we present estimates of market factor coefficients for daily rolling 
regressions.  Using OLS, each bank’s trading revenue is regressed on the market factors and 
                                                                                                                                                       
equation (4.e) in the text, using the estimated factor coefficients for  k kk V , the sample factor variances for ω , 
and the estimated factor coefficient variances used for 
kk vv σ . 
 
 
22other explanatory variables, including our proxy variables for trading volume and net interest 
payment effects on trading revenues.  The rolling window is 150 days.  The first 150-day 
regression ends on August 11, 1998 (August 14, 1998 for bank 1).  The regression equations 
are re-estimated daily dropping the last day and adding a new day using each bank’s 
available sample period.   
  In Figures 3a – 3d, plots of rolling coefficients that are representative of the results 
for the different broad market categories are presented along with 150-day coincidental 
moving averages of the respective factors.  The coefficients for each factor are in the same 
units as the random coefficient model estimates in Appendix Table A.1 (average values of 
the rolling coefficients are of the same order of magnitude as those in the random coefficient 
model in Table A.1).  The rolling means of factors are expressed as factor levels (not 
differences).  They show large ranges of variation over the sample period that includes a 
business cycle peak in March 2000 and a trough in November 2001.  The interest rate, equity 
and credit spread factors (Baa and high yield) show evidence of business cycle influences.   
  Our interest is in whether the rolling coefficients vary systematically with the factors, 
which would indicate that the dealers’ market exposures are related to market prices. 
  Consider first the coefficients for the interest rate factor plotted in Figure 3a.  The 
coefficients for all but bank 4 show a rising and declining pattern that roughly tracks the 
rising and declining interest rate pattern.  The pattern implies a tendency for the portfolio’s 
interest rate exposure to move inversely with interest rates to the point where exposures may 
go from long to short or short to long.   
  This pattern would be consistent with dealers’ reducing net long positions in longer-
term securities when interest rates are rising even to the point of taking short positions.  
 
 
23When interest rates decline, dealers increase their net long positions so that, in low interest 
rate environments, they tend to have relatively large interest rate exposures. 
  A more passive strategy also might be consistent with the results in Figure 3a.  As 
shown in equation (3), the factor coefficients measure factor exposures in terms of position 
values.   Rather than actively alter positions, dealers might have simply held their same 
positions and allowed position values to deteriorate, even becoming negative, as rates 
increased (prices declined) and then increase as rates subsequently declined.  Against this 
explanation, however, market analysts suggested that dealers were increasing their long-term 
positions as interest rates declined to low levels in the early 2000s.
8      
  Aside from the explanation for the rolling interest rate coefficients, it is shown in 
Table 7 that cross-bank correlations for the coefficients are all positive.  This re-enforces the 
impression from Figure 3a of common variation in the dealers’ interest rate exposures.   
  For the most part, the rolling coefficients for the other factors do not show any clear 
patterns of comovement with their respective factors that are common to all or most banks.  
In Figures 3b and 3c, plots are presented for the rolling coefficients and factors for the NYSE 
and high yield spreads.  These results are representative of results for the other factors as 
well, excluding the Russian ruble (see below). For some individual banks, co-movement is 
observed between the coefficients and factors—e.g., the NYSE rolling coefficients and 
NYSE factor for bank 2.  Whether this represents an underlying relationship for a particular 
bank or just a chance realization of the data can’t be determined.  Nonetheless, for the non-
interest rate factors, the results do not indicate any covariation between the factor exposures 
and the factors that is common among the dealers.    
                                                 
8 See Financial Times article by Jenny Wiggins, March 11, 2004.  Also see Adrian and Fleming (2005), p. 4. 
 
 
24  Something of an exception to these results is the behavior of the Russian ruble 
coefficients shown in Figure 3d.   For all 6 banks, the coefficients move toward zero in late 
August and early September 1998 as the ruble declined precipitously.  The estimated 
coefficients remain close to zero until mid-1999 (several months after the August-October 
1998 period passed out of the rolling samples).  This behavior would be consistent the banks 
becoming insulated against the ruble.
 9
 
6.  Dealer Trading Revenues on Days of Large Market Moves 
  The results from the two factor model approaches suggest that, in the aggregate, bank 
dealers are not consistently on one side of the market, except possibly for (default-free) 
interest rate exposures.   However, as described in section 2, all 6 banks had abnormally low, 
though still mostly positive, trading revenues in the latter part of 1998.  This was a period 
that included both high market volatility and sharp declines in credit and other risky asset 
prices and increases in U.S. Treasury security prices.  In a final exercise, we look to see 
whether dealer trading revenues might be commonly related to price movements on days of 
large price changes.  This may not be evident in the factor model regressions based on the 
full samples where on many days price changes are small.   
  For simplicity, days of relatively large price increases and, separately, price declines 
are identified only for the broad market categories—exchange rate, equity, interest rate and 
credit.   For each market factor, days where factor shocks fall into the 1st quintile and the 5th 
quintile are separately sorted.  For a market category, a large market decline day (a large 
market increase day) is defined as a day where at least one factor in the category is in the 1st 
                                                 
9 While difficult to see in the Figure, prior to convergence to zero, the rolling coefficients across the 6 banks 
were quite different and included both positive and negative coefficient values, implying long and short 
exposures in the ruble.  Note also that the volatility of the ruble (measured as absolute daily log changes) 
remained above pre-August 1998 levels over the rest of the year and into the first half of 1999.     
 
 
25(the 5th) quintile and none is in the 5th (the 1st) quintile.  For example, a day when the 
change in the NYSE index is in the 1st quintile and the NASDAQ index is not in the 5th 
quintile is a large equity market decline day.  Typically, when one factor in a market category 
experiences a large change, other factor(s) in that category change in the same direction, 
although this is less true for exchange rates (further description of the large factor changes is 
provided in Table 8).  Large market move days span the entire 6-year sample period but with 
a higher frequency in the second half of 1998. 
  Mean and median bank trading revenues, for low and high market return days for 
each of the four market categories are reported in Table 8.  Except for the interest rate 
category, mean and median trading revenues for the 6 banks on low return days in each of the 
other market categories are not uniformly lower, or higher, than on high return days.  For 
these market categories, this comparison does not indicate that dealers market exposures bear 
a common systematic relation to market prices.  For the interest rate category, on days of 
large rate increases, trading revenues are uniformly lower across the 6 banks than on days of 
large rate declines, suggesting long (positive duration) interest rate exposures are typical.  
These results are consistent with the results from the factor models. 
  While heterogeneity in exposures will reduce the likelihood of large aggregate dealer 
losses, the chance realization of losses (or abnormally high returns) for a group of dealers is 
still more likely during a period when volatility is high across markets.  The summer and 
autumn of 1998 was such a period and the higher volatility in the banks’ trading revenues is 
apparent from Figure 2.
10   Nonetheless, with cross-bank heterogeneity in exposures, losses 
                                                 
10 We also looked at absolute trading revenues on days of high and low absolute changes in market factors, 
where absolute values are used to measure the size of daily fluctuations or volatility.  Days of high and low 
volatility were defined at the market category level using an analogous procedure to that followed in 
determining days of large market declines and large increases (Table 8), except in terms of the size of absolute 
 
 
26are likely to come from positions in different markets.  For the 1998 third and fourth quarters, 
major U.S. bank dealers reported quarterly losses or low revenues in different market 
categories—interest rate (including credit), equity, and commodities.
 11  For the 6 banks’ 
studied here, it was also the case that different banks reported quarterly losses or low returns 
in different markets.    
 
7.  Conclusions    
  To recap the main results, the bank dealers do not consistently maintain exposures on 
one side of the market, with the exception of small average long exposures to interest rate 
risk.  They vary their exposures in size and direction but, except for interest rate exposures, 
the variation is heterogeneous across the dealers.  Interest rate exposures tend to vary 
inversely with the level of interest rates.  Variation in trading revenues from market 
exposures also does not seem large relative to the variation in total trading revenues that also 
include fee, spread and net interest income.  
  These results are subject to important limitations imposed by limitations of the 
trading revenue data that were used, inherent factor model limitations, and to a small sample 
of bank dealers.  Also, the two factor modeling approaches employ different underlying 
assumptions whose consequences have not been examined.  If these limitations are put aside, 
a number of points can be made about the relation between dealer market risks, VaR, and 
market prices based on the results. 
                                                                                                                                                       
factor changes.  For each of the 6 banks, mean and median absolute 1-day trading revenues are consistently 
higher on high market volatility days than on low market volatility days for all 4 market categories, with 
significance at the .05 level for almost 75 percent of the mean and median calculations.       
11 For large bank dealers, see “Bank Derivatives Report, Fourth Quarter 2001,” Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency, p. 13. Note that the quarterly revenue reports include fee and spread income, as well as changes in 
position market values. 
 
 
27  Heterogeneity in dealers’ market exposures reduces the likelihood that dealers as a 
group will incur large losses in periods of market stress or that their aggregate risk taking 
behavior contributes significantly to a “herding” phenomenon.  The heterogeneity in 
exposures also applies to arguments that dealers’ common use of VaR for risk management 
leads to herding behavior.  Shifts in market volatility could produce common changes in 
dealers’ VaRs and desired risk exposures but without leading to common directional shifts in 
risky asset demands because dealers have both short and long positions.   A potential 
exception is commonality in adjustments to interest rate risk exposures. 
  While heterogeneity in dealers’ market exposures reduces the likelihood of large 
aggregate dealer losses, the chance occurrence of common losses (or abnormally high 
returns) among banks is still more likely in a period of generally high market volatility.  The 
summer and autumn of 1998 was such a period when volatility was high across markets and 
dealers’ losses or low returns occurred in different markets.       
  Especially during periods of extreme market conditions, there are areas of dealer 
activity other than securities trading that may be more important to financial market stability 
and bank risk.  This would include dealers’ market-making role under extreme market 
conditions.  For example, see Routledge and Zinn (2004) with some empirical evidence on 
the summer and autumn of 1998 in Furfine and Remolona (2002)).  Also potentially 
important is dealer, including parent bank, credit exposures to hedge funds and other 
important market players.  The issue of bank credit exposures to hedge funds and large 
market players is taken up in Kho, Lee, and Stulz (2000), Furfine and Remolona (2002), and 
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Factor Model Derivations 
 
1.  Factor Model Portfolio Value (equation (2)) 
  Here the 1-period change in the value of the portfolio shown in equation (2) is 
derived.  Two assumptions are used.  One is a self-financing constraint within the period,  
  The second is that price and position changes within the 
period are uniform: 
0
1
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position for security k is 
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kt x .  The derivation uses continuous price and position changes 
within the period.  The change in the value of the portfolio is   
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2.   Cross-Bank Portfolio Value Correlation Due to Market Factors  (equation (5)) 
  The correlation in portfolio value changes between bank i and j due to market factor 
shocks is derived under the assumptions used for the random coefficient model presented in 
(4).   The following vector notation is used here:  ,  ,  () rt ( ) i Vt i V and   are ( ) i vt 1 K × vectors of 
 
 
31the market factors, factor coefficients, mean coefficients and random coefficient components, 
respectively.  The factor shocks   are assumed to have a zero expected value.    () rt
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  Since the factor shocks are zero mean, the (unconditional) covariance between 
portfolio returns to i and j is  [ ] [ [ ( ) ( )| ( )]].
ij ww i j r i j Ew w E Ewtw t rt σ ≡=   Applying 
[ [ () ()| () ] ] ri j E Ewtw t rt  to (A.3) yields  
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where  [() () ] E rtr t ′ Ω≡  is the covariance matrix for  and  () rt [ ( ) ( )] kl k l Er trt ω ≡  the covariance 
for and  .   ( ) k rt ( ) l rt i VV ′Ω j is the covariance between changes in bank i and bank j’s portfolio 
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covariance between changes in i and j’s  portfolio values due to the interaction between the 
 
 
32random shifts in the coefficients and the market factors.  Note the sign for
ik jk vv k k σ ω  is the 
same as that for 
ik jk vv σ . 
  To obtain the correlation coefficient for  and  , define  ( ) i wt () j wt ˆˆ ij ww i j VV σ ′ ≡Ω and 
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≡∑∑   Define 
ij ww ρ as the correlation between  and  . Using this 
notation, we can express the various correlations and covariances between between changes 
in i and j’s portfolio values as follows:  
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Also, from (A.4), we have  ˆˆ .
ij i i i i ww ww uu σ σσ =+ Using this result with the definitions in (A.5), 
gives the unconditional correlation between changes in i and j’s portfolio values shown in 
equation (5) in the text:       
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Bank Dates Obs Mean Kurtosis Skewness
1 1/98 - 12/00 762 1.05 10.75 -0.60
2 1/98 - 9/00 711 0.79 4.82 0.16
3 1/98 - 9/01 1524 0.77 13.13 1.49
4 1/98 - 12/03 1544 0.90 4.17 0.46
5 1/98 - 12/03 1551 0.62 6.46 -0.62
6 1/98 - 6/02 1166 0.72 79.64 -3.98
0.005 0.01 0.05 0.95 0.99 0.995
1 0.074 -2.29 -1.83 -0.22 2.72 3.77 4.15
2 0.132 -3.05 -1.98 -0.63 2.39 3.93 5.15
3 0.146 -2.99 -2.18 -0.60 2.24 3.11 3.89
4 0.111 -1.83 -1.63 -0.54 2.71 4.08 4.57
5 0.188 -3.41 -2.45 -0.84 2.15 3.40 4.15
6 0.147 -1.87 -1.40 -0.55 2.16 3.49 3.90
Table 1.   Daily Trading Revenue Descriptive Statistics




1. Trading revenues in both panels are divided by bank's sample standard deviations. 




Bank 1 Bank 2 Bank 3 Bank 4 Bank 5 Bank 6
Bank 1 0.415 0.210 0.182 0.028 0.145
Bank 2 -0.027 0.112 0.070 0.158 0.147
Bank 3 0.099 -0.151 0.243 0.169 0.145
Bank 4 0.060 -0.812 0.130 0.048 0.146
Bank 5 -0.119 0.684 0.097 -0.503 0.094
Bank 6 -0.314 -0.300 -0.271 0.627 -0.330
Table 2.  Cross-Bank Trading Revenue Correlations and VaR        
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country weight country weight country weight country weight
Germany 0.54 Euro 0.633 Japan 0.727 Mexico 0.658
UK 0.198 UK 0.222 Austral 0.136 Brazil 0.342
France 0.092 Switzer 0.102 HK 0.075
Switzer 0.127 Sweden 0.043 Sing 0.035
Sweden 0.043 Korea 0.027
Table 3.  Market Factors
3a. Market Factors: Daily Changes 1998 - 2003
1
1.  Units for factor means and standard deviations:  Exchange rates and equity means are daily log differences of levels; interest 
rates and credit spreads are daily first differences of levels expressed as percentage points.
2. Credit spreads are spreads from treasury rates with the same maturity.  Embi+ is JP Morgan's Emerging Markets Bond 
Spread Index Plus.
mean      





mean       
(std dev)  
Interest 
Rates
   mean      
(std dev)   
Russia     5-yr hi yield 
Asian Paci  10-yr swap 
W Europe  (1999 – 02) Asian Pacific South America W Europe (1998)
3. Regional exchange rates are weighted log differences.  Weights are based on world-wide dealer FX Spot and derivatives 
turnover volume reported for different currencies.  Turnover volume is taken mostly from the 2002 BIS Central Bank Survey.  
The survey date is June April 2001.  June 1998 turnover volume from the 1999 Central bank Survey is used to determine 
weights for Western Europe currencies for pre-Euro 1998 (country coverage in the 1998 survey is limited).
Exchange 
Rates
3b.  Exchange Rates with U.S. Dollar:  Construction of Regional Indices
3
Equity 
mean      










36Bank 1 Bank 2 Bank 3 Bank 4 Bank 5 Bank 6
0.18 0.15 0.22 0.32 0.15 0.07
10.09 7.64 27.44 45.36 17.93 5.33
1.84 1.05 2.36 7.93 0.97 1.88
728 681 1,484 1,485 1,483 1,109
0.06 0.18 0.08 0.03 0.04 0.02
3.82 13.73 11.07 4.16 5.59 1.98
728 681 1,484 1,485 1,483 1,109












        Table 4.  Summary Statistics for Factor Model                           
and Coefficient Variances Regressions 
regression R
2









0.062 0.062 -0.066 0.192 -0.732 0.833 0.076 0.076 -0.813 0.648 0.062 0.062
fx russia
-0.087 0.169 -0.410 0.575 -0.586 1.042 -0.004 -0.004 -0.461 0.516 -0.047 -0.047
fx asia pac
-1.413 0.982 -1.422 1.215 -0.909 0.861 0.046 0.046 -1.261 1.329 0.007 0.007
fx so amer
-0.049 -0.049 -0.071 -0.071 -0.688 0.676 -0.932 1.046 -0.080 -0.080 0.164 0.164
nyse
-1.295 1.043 -1.087 0.850 0.052 0.052 -0.414 0.887 -0.149 -0.149 -1.334 1.243
nasdaq
-0.650 0.815 0.108 0.108 -0.081 0.094 -1.083 0.939 0.044 0.044 -0.063 -0.063
10-yr treas
-1.356 0.803 0.101 0.101 -1.970 1.590 -0.204 -0.204 -1.979 1.836 -1.063 0.888
Baa sprd 
-0.041 -0.041 -0.938 1.268 -0.083 -0.083 0.022 0.022 -0.021 -0.021 0.162 0.162
hi yld sprd 
-0.081 -0.081 -1.406 1.428 -1.219 0.883 -1.085 0.708 -0.037 -0.037 -0.910 0.455
10 yr swap sprd 
-1.193 1.159 -0.266 0.236 -0.554 0.705 0.012 0.012 0.025 0.025 -0.037 -0.037
embi+ sprd 
-1.954 1.966 -1.879 2.041 -2.094 1.826 -2.307 1.613 -1.992 1.928 -1.913 2.007
Bank 6
0.051 0.076




Bank 1 Bank 2 Bank 3 Bank 4 Bank 5
-0.082 0.062
0.041 0.082 0.228 -0.004 0.028 -0.047
0.062 0.063
-0.216 -0.103 -0.024 0.046





0.082 0.108 0.007 -0.072 0.044 -0.063
-0.126 -0.118
-0.276 0.101 -0.190 -0.204





-0.017 -0.015 0.075 0.012 0.025 -0.037
-0.081 0.011
-0.032
1. Scaled coefficients equal the change in trading revenue measured in terms of trading revenue standard deviations due to 2 
standard deviation factor shocks.  Shaded cells indicate the estimated variance was negative.
2. Factors expressed as log changes for exchange rates and equity and first differences for interest rate and credit spreads.




38Bank 1 Bank 2 Bank 3 Bank 4 Bank 5 Bank 6
Bank 1 0.415 0.21 0.182 0.028 0.145
Bank 2 0.301 0.112 0.070 0.158 0.147
Bank 3 0.139 0.064 0.243 0.169 0.145
Bank 4 -0.011 -0.028 0.138 0.048 0.146
Bank 5 0.029 0.121 0.042 0.017 0.094
Bank 6 0.123 0.107 0.056 0.063 0.045
6.  Cross-Bank Trading Revenue Correlation due to Market Factors
1     
(unconditional trading revenue correlations above diagonal; correlations 
due to market factors below diagonal)
1. The cross-bank correlations due to market factors were calculated using equation (5).  





xwe xru xap xsa nyse nasdaq r10yr Baa hy  yld swap  embi
median correlation 0.09 0.03 0.18 0.28 0.18 0.20 0.74 0.16 0.59 0.25 0.13
percent pos correlation 53 53 53 67 73 60 100 60 80 67 67
Table 7.  Cross-Bank Correlations for Rolling Regression Coefficients
1 




Decline Increase Decline Increase Decline Increase Decline Increase
Bank Bank
1 1.14 1.04 1.07 0.97 1 1.29* 1.00 1.22* 0.90
2 0.87 0.85 0.82 0.78 2 0.93 0.85 0.82 0.80
3 0.70 0.81 0.70 0.75 3 0.86* 0.71 0.90* 0.72
4 0.85 0.98* 0.81 0.81 4 0.95 0.93 0.87 0.78
5 0.60 0.61 0.55 0.59 5 0.69* 0.57 0.70* 0.55
6 0.63 0.69 0.63 0.68 6 0.87* 0.63 0.81* 0.64
Decline Increase Decline Increase Decline Increase Decline Increase
Bank Bank
1 1.17 1.06 1.06 0.89 1 1.00 1.13 0.93 1.13
2 0.93 0.77 0.86 0.78 2 0.72* 0.92 0.64* 0.84
3 0.74 0.86 0.78 0.85 3 0.84 0.73 0.76 0.78
4 0.83 1.20* 0.80 0.93* 4 1.01 0.91 0.85 0.83
5 0.60 0.51 0.59 0.45 5 0.68 0.63 0.64 0.61
6 0.82 0.72 0.75 0.75 6 0.73 0.73 0.66 0.77
1. Bank trading revenue is normalized by full sample bank trading revenue standard deviations.  Sample sizes for each of the 
"Decline" and "Increase" categories range from 167 to 606, depending on the bank. and the category.  Sample sizes for each of 
the "Decline" and "Increase" categories range from 167 to 606, with a median of 323.  For  each factor in its designated 
market category (e.g., nyse for equity category), its mean value  for the "Decline" quintile is 1 to 2 standard deviations below its 
mean value for the "Increase."                                                                                                                                           
*Significant at .05 for difference between "Decline" and "Increase" day trading revenue mean (median) value.  Means test is a 
standard difference of two means.  Medians test uses the Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon rank sum test for large samples.                   
Interest Rate Change
Trading Rev: Mean Trading Rev: Median
Trading Rev: Mean Trading Rev: Median
Exchange Rate Change
Trading Rev: Mean Trading Rev: Median
Equity Price Change
Trading Rev: Mean Trading Rev: Median
Credit Spread Changes







Va r i a b l e 123456
constant β0 -0.105 1.152 -0.575 -2.632 1.397 0.422
t-value -0.26 2.81 -2.54 -11.24 5.51 1.44
fx we β1 5.568 5.652 4.528 6.771 -7.380 5.575
t-value 0.92 0.94 1.02 1.64 -1.52 1.13
fx russia β2 0.901 1.814 5.011 -0.088 0.605 -1.038
t-value 0.56 0.97 2.57 -0.08 0.35 -0.72
fx asia pac β3 -17.873 -8.553 -2.006 3.794 2.843 0.550
t-value -3.02 -1.45 -0.47 1.01 0.58 0.13
fx s amer β4 -3.993 -5.830 -0.506 4.637 -6.527 13.453
t-value -0.60 -0.91 -0.12 1.03 -1.43 2.43
nyse β5 -5.437 -5.112 2.241 10.230 -6.432 -1.959
t-value -1.19 -1.14 0.79 3.50 -2.06 -0.53
nasdaq β6 1.855 2.440 0.148 -1.621 0.985 -1.410
t-value 0.92 1.19 0.10 -1.07 0.62 -0.89
10-yr treas β7 -2.192 0.804 -1.507 -1.618 -0.566 -0.696
t-value -2.23 0.78 -2.38 -2.89 -0.85 -0.99
Baa sprd β8 -0.593 2.355 -1.184 0.314 -0.305 2.312
t-value -0.41 1.58 -1.30 0.36 -0.31 2.12
hi yld sprd β9 -0.434 0.059 -0.901 -1.011 -0.200 -1.218
t-value -0.62 0.07 -2.06 -2.46 -0.48 -2.48
swap sprd  β10 -0.268 -0.235 1.181 0.191 0.397 -0.582
t-value -0.21 -0.21 1.53 0.28 0.51 -0.64
embi+ sprd  β11 0.013 0.168 -0.279 -0.722 -0.066 0.097
t-value 0.07 0.86 -2.12 -5.55 -0.44 0.52
equity vol β12 0.353 0.418 0.223 0.363 0.083 0.236
t-value 3.78 4.21 4.97 8.07 1.71 4.00
10-yr treas  β13 0.143 -0.124 0.150 0.529 -0.206 0.024
move ave t-value 1.91 -1.60 4.07 13.42 -5.03 0.47
PLt-1 β14 0.142 0.181 0.203 0.227 -0.081 -0.028
t-value 4.03 5.09 8.30 9.65 -3.17 -1.07
trend β15 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000
t-value 3.59 3.45 9.05 12.08 6.71 4.37
F-Stat2 9.236 6.081 22.368 44.293 14.593 4.576
R
2 0.172 0.128 0.196 0.325 0.137 0.063
N 728 681 1484 1485 1483 1109
Table A.1. Market Factor Model for Bank Trading Revenue
1 
Bank
1. Trading revenues are divided by the banks' sample standard deviations.  Equity volume has been 
scaled by 1 million.  Coefficients are estimated for equation (4.a) in the text with additional 
explanatory variables described in the text.  A GLS estimator is used, which is described in Hilreth 
and Houck  (1968).  See their description for  β, second equation  in (25), p. 589.
 
 
42V a r i a b l e 123456
constant α0 0.48 0.40 0.44 0.57 0.56 0.90
t-value 3.25 3.89 5.86 8.21 5.76 2.41
fx w eur α1 -528.20 34.75 1281.02 -87.84 1114.55 -2052.03
t-value -0.26 0.02 1.19 -0.09 0.80 -0.39
fx russia α2 2.05 30.54 83.44 -19.82 30.01 -108.13
t-value 0.10 2.18 5.85 -1.51 1.62 -1.75
fx asia pac α3 2567.56 3111.68 1401.34 -240.30 3002.21 -449.13
t-value 3.00 5.26 2.43 -0.45 4.00 -0.18
fx s amer α4 -1526.15 -333.83 810.87 1705.42 -862.05 -2801.47
t-value -1.71 -0.54 1.57 3.58 -1.28 -1.13
nyse α5 665.46 456.79 -301.12 206.31 -35.02 808.70
t-value 1.28 1.19 -1.22 0.90 -0.11 0.56
nasdaq α6 70.81 -80.79 1.01 134.72 -38.89 -154.61
t-value 0.56 -0.70 0.02 2.23 -0.46 -0.51
10-yr treas α7 19.11 -4.55 51.94 -8.02 59.64 15.60
t-value 0.74 -0.25 5.87 -0.98 5.10 0.31
Baa sprd α8 -58.85 64.78 -78.46 -29.95 -16.59 -69.86
t-value -0.86 1.44 -3.07 -1.27 -0.50 -0.55
hi yld sprd α9 -0.15 15.00 8.25 6.00 -0.55 3.48
t-value -0.02 1.52 3.24 2.56 -0.17 0.28
swap sprd α10 88.76 4.04 25.43 -15.60 -15.92 -24.42
t-value 2.49 0.16 1.42 -0.95 -0.68 -0.25
embi+ sprd α11 1.39 1.68 0.19 0.37 0.56 4.73
t-value 3.11 5.73 0.78 1.68 1.79 4.44
F-Stat F-Stat 3.82 13.73 11.07 4.16 5.59 1.98
R
2 R
2 0.06 0.18 0.08 0.03 0.04 0.02
N N 728 681 1484 1485 1483 1109
Table A.2. Estimates of Coefficient Variances for Market Factors
1
Bank
1. The coefficients (variances) and their standard errors use an unbiased least-squares estimator 





43Figure 1. Densities for Bank Trading Revenues  
 
 












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1. Values are expressed as deviations from the banks’ sample means and in terms of the sample standard deviations.  












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































48Figure 3d.  Russian Ruble Regression Coefficients and Moving-Average Exchange Rate  
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